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Status and power covary such that higher status groups are typically higher power groups. 
This research explored the effect of status on intergroup perception controlling for power.
Experiment 1 manipulated the relative status of social groups and explicitly provided the
groups equal power. Experiment 2 manipulated status and power orthogonally. Multiple
measures yielded consistent patterns indicating that status affected perceived group centrality
and variability independent of power. The patterns were consistent with a strategic intergroup
comparison account as suggested by social identity theory. Specifically, the effect of status on
intergroup perception varied with the relevance and valence of the dimension of comparison
in a manner that balanced social reality with a positive social identity.
keywords group perception, group variability, heterogeneity, homogeneity, 
in-group homogeneity, ingroup homogeneity, intergroup perception, outgroup
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RESEARCH on intergroup perception suggests
that persons regard ingroups more favorably
than outgroups (e.g. Brewer, 1979; Mullen,
Brown, & Smith, 1992) and perceive more vari-
ability among ingroup than outgroup members
(Park & Rothbart, 1982; Quattrone & Jones,
1980). Intergroup perception, however, does
not invariantly yield a more favorable and
heterogeneous image of the ingroup. Indeed,
research suggests that relative group status (e.g.
Bettencourt, Dorr, Charlton, & Hume, 2001)
moderates intergroup perception such that
members of higher status groups express
stronger ingroup favoritism and perceive
outgroup homogeneity, whereas members of
lower status groups express less ingroup
favoritism and perceive either ingroup homo-
geneity or equivalent variability within the
ingroup and outgroup (Boldry & Kashy, 1999;
Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1998).
Social identity theory (SIT; Tajfel & Turner,
1979) proposes that intergroup status is a moti-
vating factor in intergroup perception because
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group membership is internalized as an aspect
of the self that provides members with a social
identity. Membership in a low status group can
prove threatening because a positively valued
social identity is derived primarily through
favorable intergroup comparison. SIT outlines
three strategies by which members of low status
groups achieve a positively valued social
identity. The lower status group can challenge
the higher status group and reverse the status
structure through social change. However, such
social change can be difficult and, depending
on the circumstances, might not be feasible
(e.g. Ellemers, Van Knippenberg, & Wilke,
1990). Alternatively, members of the low status
group can choose the path of individual
mobility, particularly when group boundaries
are permeable, and seek inclusion in the higher
status group (e.g. Ellemers, Van Knippenberg,
De Vries, & Wilke, 1988). A third possibility is a
more strategic process in which group
members engage in intergroup comparison on
alternative social dimensions that are more
favorable for the ingroup.
Research on the latter process suggests that
strategic intergroup comparison is used rather
flexibly, particularly on ambiguous dimensions
that lack social consensus as to which group is
superior. Such ambiguous dimensions are more
amenable to motivated biases that distort per-
ception and yield a favorable impression of the
ingroup. Indeed, Ellemers, Van Rijswijk, Roefs,
and Simons (1997) suggest that members of
low status groups are ‘likely to take consensually
defined differences between the groups into
account while displaying ingroup favoring
biases with respect to more ambiguous aspects
of the intergroup comparison’ (p. 187). In
regard to perceptions of group variability, data
are relatively consistent with a strategic inter-
group comparison process. Although Ellemers
and Van Rijswijk (1997) did not compare the
perceived variability of the ingroup to that of
the outgroup, they reported that members of
the low status group perceived more variability
among ingroup members on dimensions
relevant to the intergroup status structure than
on dimensions irrelevant to the status structure.
Enhancing the perceived heterogeneity of the
ingroup on less desirable dimensions ostensibly
softens the blow of intergroup comparison (e.g.
‘we’re not all bad’). Similarly, Rubin, Hewstone,
and Voci (2001) compared perceptions of the
relative variability of the ingroup and outgroup
and reported stronger outgroup homogeneity
(i.e. ingroup heterogeneity) on dimensions
that threaten the ingroup’s relative status. Such
patterns are consistent with the possibility that
intergroup status triggers a strategic social
identity enhancement process that affects inter-
group perception. Although members of low
status groups are particularly apt to make strate-
gic intergroup comparisons, the strategic com-
parison process is by no means limited to
members of low status groups. Members of high
status groups might also use strategic inter-
group comparisons to maintain and bolster
their group’s relative social value. Indeed,
research in the minimal group paradigm, in
which groups ostensibly have equivalent status,
frequently evidences such strategic intergroup
comparisons in the form of ingroup-favoring
ratings (Brewer, 1979).
Is it status or power?
Although previous research yields patterns con-
sistent with SIT’s account of status, a confound
inherent in the extant data calls into question
the role of status as an antecedent of inter-
group perception. In particular, status (i.e. the
social value of a person or group) and power
(i.e. the ability to control or influence) covary
in social environments such that groups higher
in status tend also to be higher in power (e.g.
Barth & Noel, 1972; Carli & Eagly, 1999;
Guinote, Judd, & Brauer, 2002; Hewstone,
Rubin, & Willis, 2002; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).
The confluence of status and power most obvi-
ously affects studies that test status-effects
among existing groups, such as those defined by
gender (e.g. Bardach & Park, 1996; Lorenzi-
Cioldi, 1993), ethnicity (e.g. Cabecinhas &
Amancio, 1999), military rank (e.g. Boldry &
Kashy, 1999), or profession (Brown & Wootten-
Millward, 1993). Also affected, however, are
minimal group studies that manipulate status
between novel groupings (e.g. Lorenzi-Cioldi,
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 9(3)
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Deaux, & Dafflon, 1998). Due to the typical
confluence of status and power, members of
minimal groups attribute higher power to the
higher status group (e.g. Sachdev & Bourhis,
1991). Consequently, effects conceptualized in
terms of status may actually be consequences of
power. Indeed, a growing literature has begun
documenting the perceptual effects of relative
group power.
Power, for example, indirectly affects inter-
group perception by altering a group’s actual
behavioral diversity (Guinote et al., 2002).
Because power ostensibly liberates persons from
the constraints of social forces (e.g. norms,
expectations) members of higher power groups
can manifest a greater diversity of behaviors and
are perceived to be more heterogeneous than
are members of lower power groups. Consistent
with such an account, participants who observed
members of high and low power groups but
were themselves neither affiliated with the
groups nor aware of the power differential per-
ceived more variability among the members of
the high than low power group.
Power also directly affects perception by dif-
ferentially altering the extent to which group
members attend to the idiosyncratic character-
istics of ingroup and outgroup members. Fiske
and colleagues (Fiske, 1993; Fiske & Depret,
1996; Neuberg & Fiske, 1987) suggest that
members of a lower power group, whose
outcomes can be affected greatly by the actions
of the higher power group, are apt to attend to
the traits and attributes of the members of the
higher power outgroup. On the other hand,
members of the higher power group, whose
outcomes are relatively impervious to the
actions of the lower power group, have little
reason to attend to and individuate members of
the lower power outgroup. Such differential
attention provides members of the lower power
group with a more diverse and individuated
perception of the outgroup.
Data from Sedikides (1997) offer an example
of the inferential problem posed by the typical
confluence of status and power. Based on SIT’s
upward mobility strategy, Sedikides (1997) pre-
dicted that members of low status permeable
groups would be particularly apt to attend to
the attributes of the higher status group to
learn what it takes to ‘become one of them’.
Members of low and high status groups subse-
quently reviewed the names and alleged
attributes of ingroup and outgroup members.
Clustering patterns from a free recall task and
confusion-errors from a name-to-attribute
matching task revealed that members of high
status groups individuated ingroup members
more than outgroup members and members of
low status groups individuated outgroup
members more than ingroup members (also
see Lorenzi-Cioldi et al., 1998). Such patterns
are consistent with the predicted effect of
status. However, the low and high status groups
recruited in the research likely differed in
regard to power (i.e. undergraduate vs.
graduate students and freshmen vs. sopho-
mores) and the observed patterns are consist-
ent with the previously described power
account offered by Fiske and colleagues.
Why distinguish status from power?
Distinguishing between relative group status
and power is important because those con-
structs imply different mechanisms. Relative
group status implies that social identity and
esteem needs operate as antecedents of inter-
group perception. Relative group power
implies that the (in)ability to function freely of
constraints operates as an antecedent of inter-
group perception. Of course, status and power
need not be mutually exclusive, such that both
constructs can be involved in intergroup per-
ception. Past research, however, has not success-
fully distinguished between the effects of status
and power. The purpose of the current
research is to test whether intergroup status
affects intergroup perception independent of
power.
The current research
To circumvent the inferential difficulty posed by
the typical confluence of status and power, we
manipulated the status of novel groups using
the minimal group paradigm and explicitly
provided the groups with equivalent power in
Boldry & Gaertner status and intergroup perception
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an initial experiment and manipulated status
orthogonal to power in an additional experi-
ment.1
Sachdev and Bourhis (1991) unsuccessfully
manipulated status orthogonal to power using
minimal groups. They manipulated status by
ostensibly assigning participants to groups
based on a creativity test: one group consisted
of creative persons and the other group con-
sisted of uncreative persons. Participants subse-
quently performed an allocation task in which
they allocated extra-credit points to ingroup
and outgroup members. Sachdev and Bourhis
manipulated power by informing participants
prior to the allocation task that they would dis-
regard the allocation decisions from members
of one group (i.e. the no power group); a coin
toss determined which group would not have
power over the allocations. The flaw, in an
otherwise inventive design, is that participants
received ingroup and outgroup members’ solu-
tions to a second creativity test and were
instructed to award credit points in a manner
that reflected the creativity of the solutions.
Unfortunately, the status manipulation under-
mined the power manipulation in that partici-
pants could infer that members of the high
status (i.e. more creative) group would
generate more creative solutions to the second
test and, consequently, should receive more
points. Indeed, manipulation checks revealed
that the status manipulation increased the per-
ceived power of the high vs. low status group.
Despite attempts to independently manipulate
status and power, participants attributed more
power to the high status group. We avoided this
problem by manipulating status and power on
unrelated tasks.
We created a social context that was most
appropriate for testing the plausibility of the
strategic intergroup comparison account
offered by SIT. We created groups with rela-
tively impermeable boundaries to minimize
attempts at upward mobility. To capture the
strategic intergroup comparison process
suggested by SIT, we assessed intergroup per-
ception on three dimensions (established via
pilot testing), each of which consisted of three
positively valued and three negatively valued
attributes. One dimension was relevant to the
status hierarchy, a second dimension was
relevant to the power hierarchy, and a third
dimension was irrelevant to the status and
power hierarchies. The latter irrelevant dimen-
sion provided an ambiguous dimension on
which participants could evidence strategic
intergroup perception and maintain percep-
tions favorable to their ingroup.
Following Kelley and Thibaut (1978), we
operationalized power as the degree of control
a group has over another group’s outcomes
(i.e. fate control) and employed two different
manipulations of power across two experi-
ments. We categorized participants into groups
ostensibly on the basis of their artistic prefer-
ences (e.g. Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament,
1971). We manipulated the relative status of the
groups by providing false feedback regarding
the relative performance of the ingroup and
outgroup on a problem-solving task. To facili-
tate the power manipulations, participants were
informed that their group would interact with
the other group on a two-choice payoff matrix
(i.e. similar to a Prisoner’s Dilemma Matrix)
and would earn money based on the inter-
action. Figure 1 displays the three matrices used
across the experiments, the values of which
were defined as the number of pennies avail-
able to each group member.
As described by Kelley and Thibaut (1978),
we derived the outcome values in the matrices
from three components of interdependence:
reflexive control, fate control, and behavioral
control. Reflexive control indexes the degree to
which a group can directly affect its own
outcome by varying between available behaviors
(i.e. matrix choices). Fate control indexes the
degree to which a group can directly affect the
other group’s outcome by varying between
available choices. Behavioral control indexes
the degree to which a group’s outcomes are
jointly influenced by its own choices in conjunc-
tion with the other group’s choices. We held
constant both reflexive control (fixed at 30 for
both groups) and behavioral control (fixed at 0
for both groups) and varied fate control.
We assessed intergroup perception with
measures of central tendency and variability.
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 9(3)
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We assessed central tendency with mean ratings
of the ingroup and outgroup. We assessed per-
ceived variability among ingroup and outgroup
members with measures typically employed for
that purpose (e.g. Park & Judd, 1990): percent
estimate, range, and, additionally in Experi-
ment 2, similarity.2
Stimulus development
We conducted two pilot studies to obtain traits
perceived as either relevant or irrelevant to the
status and power dimensions. We subsequently
used those traits in our primary experiments to
assess intergroup perception.
Approximately 200 students in an undergrad-
uate statistics class at Texas A&M University
(TAMU) participated in the first pilot study. An
experimenter described the ‘Lost on the Moon’
task and payoff matrix task that we would use in
the primary experiments to manipulate inter-
group status and power. Participants generated
and recorded the traits they deemed relevant
and irrelevant to completing the status and
power tasks, respectively.
Ninety-six students (48 males and 48 females)
at TAMU participated in the second pilot study
for partial credit in an introductory psychology
course. The experimenter described the status
and power tasks and distributed a list of the 109
traits generated in the first pilot study. Partici-
pants provided three ratings of each trait. Par-
ticipants rated on 9-point scales (1 = not at all
related; 9 = very related) the extent to which each
trait is relevant to the status and power tasks,
respectively, and then rated the valence of each
trait (1 = negative; 9 = positive).
Based on the relevance and valence ratings
we selected three traits that best reflected each
of the six conditions formed by a factorial
crossing of a trait’s dimension (relevant to
status, relevant to power, or irrelevant to status
and power) and valence (positive or negative);
yielding 18 traits in total. To represent the
status dimension, we selected traits that
received high relevance ratings for the status
task and low relevance ratings for the power
task. Three of those traits were rated as highly
positive (survival skills, creative, and scientific)
and three were rated as highly negative
(unimaginative, inefficient, and gives-up-easily).
To represent the power dimension, we selected
traits that received high relevance ratings for
the power task and low relevance ratings for the
status task. Three of those traits were rated as
highly positive (team player, cooperative, and
agreeable) and three were rated as highly
negative (selfish, greedy, and manipulative). To
represent the irrelevant dimension, we selected
traits that received low relevance ratings for
both the status and power tasks. Three of those
traits were rated as highly positive (funny,
athletic, and happy) and three were rated as
highly negative (dull, grumpy, and shallow).
Participants in the subsequent experiments
rated the central tendency and variability of the
ingroup and outgroup on those 18 traits.
Experiment 1
We differentiated status from power by manip-
ulating the relative status of the ingroup and
outgroup in situations in which the groups had
equal power. In the independent condition,
neither group could influence the outcome of
the other group and, consequently, neither
group had power. In the interdependent con-
dition, both groups could affect the other
group’s outcomes by the same degree and, con-
sequently, both groups had the same degree of
power. Such a manipulation reflects Fiske and
colleagues’ (Fiske, 1993; Neuberg & Fiske,
1987) distinction between conditions of
outcome independence and interdependence.
As we discussed previously, Fiske and colleagues
suggest that power affects intergroup percep-
tion by motivating persons to attend to the
traits and attributes of members of those out-
groups who have power over the ingroup.
Consequently, this experiment enables a test
of whether status affects intergroup perception
independently of power by creating a hier-
archical intergroup status structure (high vs.
low) in a situation in which neither group has
power over the other (i.e. independent con-
dition) and a situation in which each group has
power over the other (i.e. interdependent con-
dition). If the effect of status on intergroup
Boldry & Gaertner status and intergroup perception
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perception is an artifact of its typical conflu-
ence with power (or operates only in the
context of a power structure), status and power
will interact such that the hypothesized pattern
of the status effect (described subsequently)
will occur in the interdependent condition in
which groups have power, but will be negated
in the independent condition in which groups
lack power. On the other hand, if status affects
intergroup perception independently of power,
the hypothesized status effect will occur equally
across levels of the interdependence manipu-
lation (i.e. will not be moderated by the
presence vs. absence of intergroup power).
As we described previously, we created a
social context using minimal groups that
enabled a test of the strategic intergroup com-
parison process as described by SIT. The low
and high status groups had relatively imperme-
able boundaries. Likewise, aside from the infor-
mation about the relative status of the groups,
group members did not receive additional
information about the idiosyncratic character-
istics of other ingroup and outgroup members.
If a strategic process biases intergroup percep-
tion in a manner that maintains or enhances a
group’s social value, the effect of status on inter-
group perceptions should be moderated by the
valence and relevance of the dimension of
intergroup comparison. In particular, the
strategic intergroup comparison process
described by SIT predicts a Status  Group
(ingroup vs. outgroup)  Relevance  Valence
interaction.
Members of high and low status groups will
acknowledge the established superiority of the
high status group on attributes relevant to the
status dimension. On the measure of central
tendency, members of both groups will
consider the positively valued status traits to be
more descriptive of the high than the low status
group and the negatively valued status traits to
be more descriptive of the low than high status
group. On the variability measures, members of
both groups will perceive relatively less variabil-
ity among members of the high status group on
the positive status traits and relatively less vari-
ability among members of the low status group
on the negative status traits. In other words,
members of the high status group will perceive
ingroup homogeneity on the positive status
traits and outgroup homogeneity on the
negative status traits and members of the low
status group will perceive outgroup homogene-
ity on the positive status traits and ingroup
homogeneity on the negative status traits.
However, members of the low status group
(and possibly the high status group) will capital-
ize on the irrelevant traits to enhance their
group’s social value. On the measure of central
tendency, members of the low (and possibly
high) status group will consider the positive
irrelevant traits to be relatively more descriptive
of their ingroup and the negative irrelevant
traits to be relatively more descriptive of
outgroup members. On the variability
measures, members of the low (and possibly
high) status group will perceive ingroup homo-
geneity on the positive irrelevant traits and
outgroup homogeneity on the negative irrele-
vant traits. Across the status and irrelevant
traits, for example, the intergroup perception
held by members of the low status group might
reflect, ‘they are all more creative than we are,
but we are all more athletic than they are’. Our
predictions do not address the power relevant
traits and we assessed perception on those traits
for exploratory purposes.
In sum, the design is a 2(status)  2(inter-
dependence)  2(group: ingroup, outgroup)
 3(trait relevance: relevant to status, relevant
to power, irrelevant to status and power) 
2(trait valence: positive, negative) mixed
factorial, with the latter three factors being
within-subject and group coding whether a trait
is rated in regard to the ingroup or outgroup.
Such a design enables a test of the predicted
pattern derived from SIT regarding members’
of high and low status groups perception of the
ingroup vs. outgroup on a given dimension of
social comparison as defined by a trait’s
relevance and valence. We can assess, for
example, whether members of low status
groups strategically enhance their social
identity by perceiving less variability among
ingroup than outgroup members (i.e. ingroup
homogeneity) on positive traits that are irrele-
vant to the status structure (e.g. ‘we are all more
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 9(3)
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athletic than they are’). Importantly, the design
distinguishes status from power and tests
whether the predicted pattern is moderated by
intergroup power (i.e. interdependence).
Method
Participants and design Altogether 232
students (116 females and 116 males) at TAMU
participated for partial credit in an introduc-
tory psychology class. To manipulate relative
status, we provided participants with false
feedback regarding the relative performance of
the ingroup and outgroup on the ‘Lost on the
Moon’ task (Hall, 1971), which required par-
ticipants to rank order 15 items in terms of
their importance for survival on the moon. To
provide an anchor point against which numeric
feedback could be assessed, participants were
informed that a score of 50 is considered
acceptable or ‘passing’. To further enhance the
importance of the task, feedback indicated that
successful performance on the moon task is
associated with academic and career success.
Participants in the high status condition were
informed that members of their artistic prefer-
ence group typically perform better than do
members of the other group and, in the current
session, their group scored a 70 and the other
group scored only a 30. Participants in the low
status condition were informed that members
of their artistic preference group typically
perform worse than do members of the other
group and that, in the current session, their
group scored only a 30 and the other group
scored a 70.
To manipulate outcome independence
versus interdependence participants antici-
pated interacting with the other group on one
of two matrices (see Figure 1; the matrix values
indicate the amount of pennies that would be
received by each group member). The high
and low status group had equal power (i.e. fate
Boldry & Gaertner status and intergroup perception
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Figure 1. Matrices used in Experiments 1 and 2.
The terms ‘Low Power’ and ‘High Power’ are displayed for didactic purposes in the matrices of Experiment 2
and were replaced with the relevant group names (i.e. Klee and Kandinsky) in the actual experiments.
Independent and Interdependent Matrices of Experiment 1
Relative Power Matrix for Experiment 2
Outcome Independent Condition 
   
Klee
Group
  X Y 
45 75
X
45  45  Kandinsky
Group 45 75
Y
75  75  
Outcome Interdependent Condition 
   
Klee
Group
  X Y 
75 105
X
75  15  Kandinsky
Group 15 45
Y
105  45  
Low Power Group 
  X Y 
95 125
X
55  45  High Power 
Group 05 35
Y
85  75  
control) on both matrices. On the outcome
independent matrix, neither group could affect
the other group’s outcomes—both groups had
a fate control of 0. On the outcome interdepen-
dent matrix, both groups could affect the other
group’s outcome by US$0.60—both groups had
a fate control of 60. We fixed reflexive and
behavioral control at 30 and 0, respectively for
both groups on both matrices. We counterbal-
anced the order in which participants experi-
enced the status and outcome dependence
manipulations.
Procedure and dependent measures Students
participated in six-person same-sex sessions and
sat at separate computer cubicles. Participants
initially completed a computerized painting
preference task in which they viewed 10 pairs of
paintings and indicated the painting in each
pair they preferred (e.g. Tajfel et al., 1971).
Feedback informed participants that one
painting in each pair was a work by the artist
Klee and one was a work by the artist Kandin-
sky. To hold constant relative group size, partici-
pants were informed that half of the college
student population preferred Klee and half
preferred Kandinsky and three persons in the
current session belonged to the group of
people who prefer Klee and three belonged to
the group of people who prefer Kandinsky.
Feedback informed participants that they were
assigned to the Klee group on the basis of their
artistic preferences.
Participants subsequently completed the
‘Lost on the Moon’ task and received infor-
mation about the pending intergroup inter-
action on the payoff matrix, the order of which
was counterbalanced across participants. Par-
ticipants individually completed the moon task
on the computer and were informed that the
computer would score their solution and
aggregate their score with the scores of the
other two members of their group to calculate
a group score. Participants received either low
or high status feedback and completed a brief
exercise to ensure that they understood the
feedback.
Instructions to the matrix task indicated that
the two groups would interact on a payoff
matrix and members of both groups would
receive money based on the joint decisions of
both groups. In particular, instructions indi-
cated that each group would select a choice on
the matrix (either X or Y) and the decisions
would be made simultaneously, so neither
group would know what choice was selected by
the other group until both groups had made
their decision. Participants were further
informed that each group member would pri-
vately select their preferred decision for their
group and the group’s final decision would be
determined by a majority rule. Participants
completed a brief exercise to ensure that they
understood the matrix (e.g. ‘how much money
will your group receive if your group selects “X”
and the other group selects “Y”?’).
Computerized instructions indicated that the
groups would interact on the payoff matrix after
participants answered a series of questions.
Those questions constituted the dependent
measures and consisted of assessments of inter-
group perception and manipulation checks.
Measures of intergroup perception For each of the
18 traits, participants completed a mean rating,
percent estimate, and range measure for the
ingroup and outgroup, respectively. We
randomly varied across participants the order
in which the three measures were completed.
We randomly varied across measures the
presentation order of the 18 traits and the
order in which participants rated the ingroup
and outgroup.
For the mean measure, participants rated on a
7-point scale (1 = not at all; 7 = very much) the
degree to which a given trait described, on
average, the members of the group. For the
percent estimate task, participants indicated the
percentage of group members (0–100) who
possess a given trait. For the range task, partici-
pants indicated on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all;
7 = very much) the score that reflected the
member of the group who most possessed
the given trait and the score that reflected the
member of the group who least possessed the
given trait. The absolute value of the difference
between the latter two ratings provided an
assessment of perceived range.
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 9(3)
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Manipulation checks As a check for the status
manipulation, participants indicated on 7-point
scales (1 = not at all and 7 = very much) the
degree to which: (a) their group performed
better than the other group on the moon task;
(b) their group is better than the other group
in terms of problem solving ability; (c) the
other group performed better than their group
on the moon task; and (d) the other group is
better than their group in terms of problem
solving ability. We averaged the first two items
to assess the perceived status of the ingroup and
averaged the latter two items to assess the per-
ceived status of the outgroup, with the differ-
ence between the ingroup and outgroup
indices indicating perceptions of relative status.
As a check for the outcome dependence manipu-
lation, participants indicated on 7-point scales
(1 = not at all; 7 = very much) the extent to which:
(a) their group could influence the earnings of
the other group; (b) their group could influ-
ence the earnings of the other group by
choosing X instead of Y; (c) the other group
could influence the earnings of their group;
and (d) the other group could influence the
earnings of their group by choosing X instead
of Y. We averaged the first two items to assess
the perceived power of the ingroup and
averaged the latter two items to assess the per-
ceived power of the outgroup.
Participants completed the measures of inter-
group perception prior to the manipulation
checks. The ordering of the status and outcome
dependence checks was counterbalanced and
the ordering of their respective items varied
randomly. Participants subsequently indicated
whether they thought they were assigned to the
wrong artistic preference group. The experi-
menter then debriefed and thanked the partici-
pants.
Results
Approximately 13% (n = 32) of the participants
thought they were assigned to the wrong artistic
preference group. We excluded those partici-
pants from the analyses because we could not
discern which group served as their ingroup.
We analyzed the responses of the remaining
200 participants (100 males and 100 females).
Manipulation checks We entered the ratings
of perceived status and power into separate
2(ingroup status: high, low)  2(outcome
dependence: independent, interdependent) 
2(sex)  2(group: ingroup, outgroup) multi-
variate analyses of variance (ANOVAs). The
latter variable, group, served as a within-
subjects factor that coded whether judgments
were made of the ingroup or outgroup, respec-
tively.
Intergroup status A Group  Status effect (F(1,
192) = 384.99, p < .01), confirmed our manipu-
lation of relative status. Members of the high
status group perceived the ingroup (M = 5.13,
SD = 1.32) as having higher status than the
outgroup (M = 2.13, SD = 1.03) (F(1, 107) =
249.71, p < .01). Members of the low status
groups perceived the ingroup (M = 2.59, SD =
1.04) as having lower status than the outgroup
(M = 4.95, SD = 1.38) (F(1, 91) = 141.56, p <
.01). No other effects influenced the perceived
relative status of the ingroup and outgroup.
Intergroup outcome dependence An outcome
dependence main effect (F(1, 192) = 392.33, 
p < .01), confirmed our manipulation of inter-
group dependence. Participants perceived the
groups (both ingroup and outgroup) as having
more power in the interdependent condition
(M = 5.57, SD = 1.13) than in the independent
condition (M = 1.87, SD = 1.48). The absence of
effects involving the within-subjects group
variable indicated that, as intended, partici-
pants did not perceive power differences
between the ingroup and outgroup. Aside from
a main effect of sex, indicating that females
perceived more power than males, no other
effects influenced perceived power.
Measures of intergroup perception We
formed ingroup and outgroup indices of the
mean, percent estimate, and range measures by
averaging across the three traits in each of the
six (relevance by valence) cells for the ingroup
and outgroup, respectively. We entered the
indices into separate 2(status)  2(depen-
dence)  2(sex)  2(group: ingroup,
outgroup)  3(relevance: relevant to status,
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relevant to power, irrelevant to status and
power)  2(valence: positive, negative) multi-
variate ANOVAs, with repeated measures on the
last three factors. The mean and percent
estimate measures revealed the predicted Status
 Group  Relevance  Valence four-way
interaction, which was not moderated by inter-
dependence.
Mean measure The predicted Status  Group
 Relevance  Valence four-way interaction
was significant (F(2, 191) = 31.68, p < .01). The
top panel of Table 1 displays the relevant
means. We decomposed the four-way inter-
action by testing the Group  Relevance 
Valence effect in levels of status. The simple
three-way interaction was significant for both
the high status group (F(2, 106) = 17.64, p <
.01), and the low status group (F(2, 90) = 15.27,
p < .01).
For the high status group, the Group 
Valence interaction was significant for the
status traits (F(1, 107) = 109.05, p < .01), power
traits (F(1, 107) = 48.84, p < .01), and irrelevant
traits (F(1, 107) = 57.03, p < .01). Tests of the
group effect in levels of valence indicated that
members of the high status group considered
the ingroup relative to the outgroup to be
better described by the positive status traits
(F(1, 107) = 107.90, p < .01), positive power
traits (F(1, 107) = 60.50, p < .01), and positive
irrelevant traits (F(1, 107) = 50.43, p < .01),
whereas they considered the outgroup relative
to the ingroup to be better described by the
negative status traits (F(1,107) = 81.12, p < .01),
negative power traits (F(1, 107) = 22.34, p <
.01), and negative irrelevant traits (F(1, 107) =
46.50, p < .01).
For the low status group, the Group 
Valence interaction was marginally significant
for the status traits (F(1, 91) = 3.66, p = .06),
and significant for the irrelevant traits (F(1, 91)
= 21.87, p < .01). Tests of the group effect in
levels of valence indicated that members of the
low status group acknowledged the status differ-
ential and considered the outgroup relative to
the ingroup to be better described by the
positive status traits (F(1, 91) = 11.58, p < .01).
Concurrently, however, they evidenced a strate-
gic process of intergroup comparison on the
irrelevant traits by rating the positive irrelevant
traits as more descriptive of the ingroup than
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Table 1. Mean intergroup perception (and standard deviations) for Experiment 1 by measure as a function of status,
group, relevance, and valence
Status relevant Power relevant Irrelevant
Status Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative
Mean measure
High status
Ingroup 5.17(0.94) 2.58(0.89) 5.31(0.86) 3.11(1.02) 5.01(0.78) 2.77(0.79)
Outgroup 3.58(1.02) 3.90(1.17) 4.26(1.05) 3.68(1.01) 4.23(0.86) 3.52(1.00)
Low status
Ingroup 4.50(0.96) 2.92(0.97) 4.98(0.98) 3.15(1.02) 4.86(0.84) 2.67(1.02)
Outgroup 4.98(0.97) 2.96(0.98) 4.99(0.83) 3.43(1.12) 4.43(0.84) 3.07(1.06)
Percent estimate measure
High status
Ingroup 67.34(14.55) 25.23(13.43) 71.05(13.95) 33.72(17.85) 63.69(14.84) 26.41(13.45)
Outgroup 43.15(16.15) 41.99(18.62) 57.98(16.97) 37.84(18.17) 54.53(14.83) 35.88(17.64)
Low status
Ingroup 54.16(15.82) 30.00(14.59) 65.73(17.22) 33.45(16.97) 60.27(13.56) 25.27(16.26)
Outgroup 63.53(13.68) 29.45(15.80) 66.33(12.87) 35.50(16.73) 54.95(14.62) 30.63(16.65)
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. Sample size is 108 for high status and 92 for low status. Higher
numbers indicate that a given trait is perceived to be (a) more descriptive of the group for the mean measure, and
(b) perceived to be possessed by a greater percentage of group members for the percent estimate measure.
the outgroup (F(1, 91) = 22.41, p < .01), and the
negative irrelevant traits as more descriptive of
the outgroup than the ingroup (F(1, 91) =
13.09, p < .01).
Percent estimate measure The predicted Status 
Group  Relevance  Valence four-way inter-
action was significant (F(2, 191) = 44.45, p <
.01), which was similar in form to the inter-
action detected on the mean measure. The
bottom panel of Table 1 displays the relevant
means. The Group  Relevance  Valence
effect was significant for both the high status
group (F(2, 106) = 28.49, p < .01), and the low
status group (F(2, 90) = 20.67, p < .01).
For the high status group, the Group 
Valence interaction was significant for the
status traits (F(1, 107) = 128.21, p < .01), power
traits (F(1, 107) = 30.13, p < .01), and irrelevant
traits (F(1, 107) = 45.95, p < .01). Tests of the
group effect in levels of valence indicated that
members of the high status group perceived
that a greater percentage of ingroup than
outgroup members possessed the positive status
traits (F(1, 107) = 138.35, p < .01), positive
power traits (F(1, 107) = 52.52, p < .01), and
positive irrelevant traits (F(1, 107) = 35.42, p <
.01). On the other hand, they perceived that a
greater percentage of outgroup than ingroup
members possessed the negative status traits
(F(1, 107) = 71.66, p < .01), negative power
traits (F(1, 107) = 5.34, p < .05), and negative
irrelevant traits (F(1, 107) = 39.53, p < .01).
For the low status group, the Group 
Valence interaction was significant for the
status traits (F(1, 91) = 9.81, p < .01) and irrele-
vant traits (F(1, 91) = 25.20, p < .01). Tests of the
group effect in levels of valence indicated that
members of the low status group acknowledged
the status difference and perceived a greater
percentage of outgroup than ingroup members
possessed the positive status traits (F(1, 91) =
20.88, p < .01). At the same time, they evi-
denced a strategic process of intergroup com-
parison and perceived the positive irrelevant
traits to be possessed by a greater percentage of
ingroup than outgroup members (F(1, 91) =
16.38, p < .01), and the negative irrelevant traits
to be possessed by a greater percentage of
outgroup than ingroup members (F(1, 91) =
18.11, p < .01).
Range measure The pattern of response to the
range measure differed from the patterns on
the previous measures. The predicted Group 
Relevance  Valence  Status four-way inter-
action was not significant (F(2, 158) = 1.73, ns)
and, instead, was qualified by the five-way
interaction involving sex (F(2, 158) = 3.82, p <
.05) (See Table 2). We decomposed the inter-
action by testing the predicted four-way inter-
action separately for males and females. The
four-way interaction was significant for males
(F(2, 82) = 4.65, p < .05) but not females (F(2,
79) = .74, ns).
Decomposition of the four-way interaction
for males revealed that the pattern differed
from the predicted pattern. In particular, the
Group  Relevance  Valence three-way was
significant in the low status condition (F(2, 37)
= 4.10, p < .05) but not the high status con-
dition (F(2, 44) = 1.69, ns). In the low status
condition, the Group  Valence effect was sig-
nificant on the power traits (F(1, 41) = 6.61, p
< .05) and the irrelevant traits (F(1, 42) = 7.12,
p < .01). Pairwise comparisons revealed differ-
ential perception of the ingroup and outgroup
on only the positive irrelevant traits (F(1, 45) =
4.39, p < .05). Keeping in mind that higher
values indicate greater variability, male
members of low status groups perceived a
greater range among ingroup than outgroup
members. This pattern of perception is exactly
opposite to predictions and the patterns
detected on the previous measures, in that
results for the range reflect outgroup (not
ingroup) homogeneity on positive irrelevant
traits.
Discussion
We differentiated status from power by explic-
itly equating the groups in terms of power and
manipulating status in contexts in which both
groups could affect the other group’s outcomes
(interdependent context) or not (independent
context). In both contexts, the groups differed
in status but were equivalent in power (as our
manipulation checks confirmed).
Boldry & Gaertner status and intergroup perception
387
We created a context sensitive to the strategic
process of intergroup comparison, as described
by SIT, by assessing intergroup perception on
dimensions relevant and irrelevant to status and
power. The irrelevant dimension provided
members of the low (and high) status group
with an ambiguous arena in which they could
construct intergroup comparisons that yield a
positively distinct social identity. Both the mean
and percent estimate measures revealed the
Status  Group  Relevance  Valence inter-
action predicted by SIT and that effect was not
moderated by interdependence.
Members of low and high status groups
acknowledged the established status hierarchy
on the positive status traits. Members of both
groups considered the positive status traits to
be more descriptive of and possessed by a
greater percentage of members of the high
than low status group. Interestingly, only
members of the high status group acknowl-
edged the status difference on the negative
status traits and perceived the negative status
traits as more descriptive of and possessed by a
greater percentage of outgroup than ingroup
members.
As expected in regard to the potential for a
strategic process of intergroup comparison,
members of the low and high status groups
capitalized on the irrelevant traits to maintain
the positive value of the ingroup. Members of
both groups perceived the positive irrelevant
traits to be more descriptive of and possessed by
a greater percentage of ingroup than outgroup
members. Likewise, they perceived the negative
irrelevant traits to be more descriptive of and
possessed by a greater percentage of outgroup
than ingroup members.
We did not offer predictions for intergroup
perception on the power traits. Nonetheless,
both the mean and percent estimate measures
revealed that only members of the high status
group evidenced differential intergroup percep-
tion on the power traits. Members of the high
status group perceived positive power traits to be
more descriptive of and possessed by a greater
percentage of ingroup than outgroup members,
whereas they perceived negative power traits to
be more descriptive of and possessed by a
greater percentage of outgroup than ingroup
members. Members of the low status group did
not differentially perceive the ingroup and
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Table 2. Mean range perception (and standard deviations) in Experiment 1 as a function of group, valence,
relevance, status, and sex
Status relevant Power relevant Irrelevant
Status Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative
Males
High status
Ingroup 3.75(0.95) 3.62(1.16) 3.75(1.10) 3.81(1.07) 4.01(1.05) 3.54(1.01)
Outgroup 3.78(1.04) 3.83(0.97) 3.86(1.02) 3.70(0.95) 3.92(1.13) 3.57(1.05)
Low status
Ingroup 4.27(0.94) 4.10(1.08) 4.07(1.16) 3.76(1.12) 4.37(1.10) 3.74(1.08)
Outgroup 4.07(1.23) 3.79(1.24) 3.86(1.24) 3.87(1.29) 4.15(1.24) 3.92(1.36)
Females
High status
Ingroup 4.14(0.86) 3.86(0.86) 4.28(1.10) 4.08(1.15) 4.33(1.14) 3.83(1.06)
Outgroup 4.06(0.92) 3.99(1.01) 4.14(1.07) 4.09(1.18) 4.23(1.02) 4.03(1.10)
Low status
Ingroup 4.14(1.06) 3.90(1.13) 3.93(1.13) 3.79(1.05) 4.05(1.20) 3.71(0.94)
Outgroup 3.88(1.08) 3.81(0.98) 3.83(1.08) 3.77(1.11) 4.10(1.09) 3.73(1.00)
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. Due to some missing data, sample size varies from 52–54 for high
status males, 44–46 for low status males, 52–54 for high status females, and 42–46 for low status females. Higher
numbers indicate a greater perceived range among group members.
outgroup on the power traits. Given our lack of
predictions for the power traits, we withhold
interpretation until determining whether those
patterns replicate in the remaining experiment.
Unlike the mean and percent estimate, the
range did not yield patterns consistent with a
strategic process of motivated intergroup com-
parison. Perceived variability as assessed by the
range varied as a function of group, valence,
and relevance, but only for male members of
low status groups. Furthermore, the pattern of
variation was opposite to predictions. Males in
low status groups perceived a greater range
among ingroup than outgroup members on
positive irrelevant traits.
As a final issue, it is possible that the percent
estimate measure tapped into perceptions of
central tendency rather than perceived variabil-
ity. The minimal group procedure that we
employed to unconfound intergroup status
from power required us to use the percent
estimate measure in a manner different than it
is typically used to assess variability. Participants
typically rate the percentage of group members
who possess stereotype consistent and inconsis-
tent traits and the difference between the latter
percentages provides an estimate of the extent
to which a group is perceived to match homo-
geneously the stereotype. Because there are no
pre-existing stereotypes of minimal groups, we
had participants rate the percentage of group
members who possessed the status, power, and
irrelevant traits. Consequently, in the current
research, the percent estimate task may share
more in common with the measure of central
tendency (e.g. the mean) than measures of vari-
ability.3 To obtain an additional measure of per-
ceived variability, we include a measure of
perceived similarity in Experiment 2.
Experiment 2
In the previous experiment, we provided the
low and high status groups with equivalent
power. In the current experiment, we method-
ologically distinguished status from power by
manipulating a group’s relative status orthogo-
nal to its relative power. We again fostered a
social context sensitive to the strategic inter-
group comparison mechanism and included
perceived similarity as an additional measure of
variability.
Method
Altogether, 321 students (158 females and 163
males) at Montana State University participated
for partial credit in an introductory psychology
class. The procedure and dependent measures
were identical to those of Experiment 1 with the
exception of the manipulation of relative power
and the addition of a measure of perceived trait
similarity. We used a 2(relative ingroup status:
low, high)  2(relative ingroup power: low,
high) between-subjects factorial design. We
manipulated status as we did in the previous
experiment and manipulated power with a
single intergroup payoff matrix (see Figure 1).
The low power group could affect the outcomes
of the high power group by US$0.10 (i.e. fate
control for the low power group = 10) and the
high power group could affect the outcomes of
the low power group by US$0.90 (i.e. fate
control for the high power group = 90). Again,
both groups had reflexive control of 30 and
behavioral control of 0. Aside from the variation
in manipulated power, the procedure was iden-
tical to that of Experiment 1.
For the trait-similarity measure, participants
rated the members of the ingroup and
outgroup, respectively, on 7-point scales (1 = not
at all similar; 7 = very similar) in terms of how
similar they are in regard to each of the 18 traits
(e.g. ‘to what degree are all members of the
Klee Group similar in terms of creativity?’). As
in Experiment 1, we counterbalanced the order
in which the independent variables were
manipulated, randomized across participants
the presentation order of the measures of
intergroup perception, and randomized across
measures the ordering of the 18 traits and the
order in which participants rated the ingroup
and outgroup.
Results
Approximately 7% (n = 23) of the participants
thought they were assigned to the wrong artistic
preference group. We excluded those partici-
pants from the analyses because we could not
Boldry & Gaertner status and intergroup perception
389
discern which group served as their ingroup.
We analyzed the responses of the remaining
298 participants (149 females and 149 males).
Manipulation checks We entered the ratings of
perceived status and power into separate
2(ingroup status: low, high)  2(ingroup power:
low, high)  2(sex)  2(group: ingroup,
outgroup) multivariate ANOVAs. The latter
variable, group, served as a within-subjects
factor that coded whether judgments were
made of the ingroup or outgroup, respectively.
Intergroup status A Group  Status effect (F(1,
287) = 702.59, p < .01) confirmed our manipu-
lation of relative group status: members of the
high status group perceived the ingroup (M =
5.35, SD = 1.14) as having higher status than the
outgroup (M = 2.20, SD = .92) (F(1, 147) =
478.53, p < .01). Members of the low status
groups perceived the ingroup (M = 2.64, SD =
1.11) as having lower status than the outgroup
(M = 4.97, SD = 1.18) (F(1, 146) = 224.99, p <
.01). A Group  Status  Sex effect (F(1, 287)
= 4.01, p < .05), indicated that the Group 
Status effect, which was significant and of the
same form for males and females, was stronger
for males. No other effects influenced the per-
ceived relative status of the ingroup and
outgroup.
Intergroup power A Group  Power effect (F(1,
287) = 294.84, p < .01), confirmed our manipu-
lation of relative group power. Members of the
high power group perceived the ingroup as
having more power (M = 5.41, SD = 1.20) than
the outgroup (M = 3.60, SD = 1.31) (F(1, 147)
= 126.44, p < .01). Members of the low power
group perceived the ingroup as having less
power (M = 3.43, SD = 1.30) than the outgroup
(M = 5.59, SD = 1.16) (F(1, 146) = 173.67, p <
.01). No other effects influenced the perceived
relative power of the ingroup and outgroup.
Measures of intergroup perception We
formed ingroup and outgroup indices of the
mean, percent estimate, similarity, and range
measures by averaging across the three traits in
each of the six (relevance by valence) cells for
the ingroup and outgroup, respectively. We
entered those indices into separate 2(status) 
2(power)  2(sex)  2(group: ingroup,
outgroup)  3(relevance: relevant to status,
relevant to power, irrelevant to status and
power)  2(valence: positive, negative) multi-
variate ANOVAs, with repeated measures on the
last three factors. The mean, percent estimate,
and similarity measures revealed the predicted
Status  Group  Relevance  Valence four-
way interaction, which was similar in form to
the four-way interactions detected in the
previous experiments and was not moderated
by relative power.
Mean measure The predicted Status  Group
 Relevance  Valence four-way interaction
was significant (F(2, 289) = 57.48, p < .01). The
top panel of Table 3 displays the relevant
means. The Group  Relevance  Valence
effect was significant for both the high status
group (F(2, 147) = 29.74, p < .01) and the low
status group (F(2, 147) = 28.75, p < .01).
For the high status group, the Group 
Valence interaction was significant for the
status traits (F(1, 148) = 172.37, p < .01), power
traits (F(1, 148) = 38.20, p < .01), and irrelevant
traits (F(1, 148) = 48.11, p < .01). Tests of the
group effect in levels of valence indicated that
members of the high status group considered
the ingroup relative to the outgroup to be
better described by the positive status traits
(F(1, 148) = 166.91, p < .01), positive power
traits (F(1, 148) = 52.64, p < .01), and positive
irrelevant traits (F(1, 148) = 42.24, p < .01).
Whereas they considered the outgroup relative
to the ingroup to be better described by the
negative status traits (F(1, 148) = 108.94, p <
.01), negative power traits (F(1, 148) = 11.44, 
p < .01), and negative irrelevant traits (F(1, 148)
= 40.59, p < .01). Members of the high status
group considered the positive traits (of all
dimensions) to be more descriptive of the
ingroup and the negative traits (of all dimen-
sions) to be more descriptive of the outgroup.
For the low status group, the Group 
Valence interaction was significant for the
status traits (F(1, 148) = 28.14, p = .01) and irrel-
evant traits (F(1, 148) = 19.26, p < .01). Tests of
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the group effect in levels of valence indicated
that members of the low status group acknowl-
edged the status differential and considered the
outgroup relative to the ingroup to be better
described by the positive status traits (F(1, 148)
= 49.28, p < .01). Concurrently, however, they
evidenced a strategic process of intergroup
comparison on the irrelevant traits by rating the
positive irrelevant traits as more descriptive of
the ingroup than the outgroup (F(1, 148) =
14.88, p < .01), and the negative irrelevant traits
as more descriptive of the outgroup than the
ingroup (F(1, 148) = 14.97, p < .01).
Percent estimate measure The predicted Status 
Group  Relevance  Valence four-way inter-
action was significant (F(2, 289) = 67.29, p <
.01). The middle panel of Table 3 displays the
relevant means. The Group  Relevance 
Valence effect was significant for the high status
group (F(2, 147) = 44.53, p < .01), and low
status group (F(2, 147) = 25.58, p < .01).
For the high status group, the Group 
Valence interaction was significant for the
status traits (F(1, 148) = 147.58, p < .01), power
traits (F(1, 148) = 36.16, p < .01), and irrelevant
traits (F(1, 148) = 40.05, p < .01). Tests of the
group effect in levels of valence indicated that
members of the high status group perceived a
greater percentage of ingroup than outgroup
members possessed the positive status traits
(F(1, 148) = 170.37, p < .01), positive power
traits (F(1, 148) = 47.08, p < .01), and positive
irrelevant traits (F(1, 148) = 27.00, p < .01). On
the other hand, they perceived a greater per-
centage of outgroup than ingroup members
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Table 3. Mean intergroup perception (and standard deviations) for Experiment 2 by measure as a function of status,
group, relevance, and valence
Status relevant Power relevant Irrelevant
Status Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative
Mean measure
High status
Ingroup 5.30(1.40) 2.55(1.02) 5.24(1.01) 3.19(1.22) 4.92(1.02) 2.74(1.09)
Outgroup 3.54(1.17) 3.71(1.15) 4.35(1.24) 3.55(1.28) 4.29(1.00) 3.42(1.29)
Low status
Ingroup 4.29(1.24) 2.96(1.11) 4.81(1.21) 3.06(1.29) 4.73(1.01) 2.70(1.10)
Outgroup 5.19(1.03) 2.87(1.04) 5.03(0.99) 3.26(1.21) 4.38(0.99) 3.04(1.18)
Percent estimate measure
High status
Ingroup 70.20(17.12) 23.68(15.19) 70.33(16.39) 33.42(19.56) 63.96(15.15) 25.93(14.70)
Outgroup 45.89(19.57) 39.50(20.94) 58.50(20.02) 39.52(22.05) 56.27(16.16) 33.62(19.52)
Low status
Ingroup 56.43(18.44) 30.81(19.58) 69.06(16.56) 35.07(20.76) 62.46(14.39) 27.00(17.86)
Outgroup 67.33(17.00) 27.51(16.35) 68.68(15.41) 39.16(21.34) 57.47(13.74) 32.13(18.11)
Trait similarity measure
High status
Ingroup 5.15(1.28) 3.80(1.58) 5.19(1.11) 3.76(1.48) 4.69(1.18) 3.54(1.48)
Outgroup 4.19(1.41) 4.17(1.45) 4.49(1.30) 3.99(1.43) 4.46(1.26) 4.04(1.50)
Low status
Ingroup 4.28(1.38) 3.97(1.53) 5.00(1.31) 3.91(1.50) 4.56(1.27) 3.71(1.57)
Outgroup 5.00(1.31) 4.00(1.55) 5.03(1.26) 4.02(1.39) 4.48(1.21) 3.93(1.43)
Notes : Standard deviations are in parentheses. Sample size is 149 for high status and 149 for low status for the mean
and percent estimate measures and 149 for high status and 147 for low status for the trait similarity measure. Higher
numbers indicate that a given trait is perceived to be (a) more descriptive of the group for the mean measure,
(b) possessed by a greater percentage of group members for the percent estimate measure, and (c) shared to a
greater extent as a basis of similarity among group members for the similarity measure.
possessed the negative status traits (F(1, 148) =
77.91, p < .01), negative power traits (F(1, 148)
= 14.71, p < .05), and negative irrelevant traits
(F(1, 148) = 34.63, p < .01).
For the low status group, the Group 
Valence interaction was significant for the
status traits (F(1, 148) = 21.72, p < .01) and
irrelevant traits (F(1, 148) = 23.82, p < .01).
Tests of the group effect in levels of valence
indicated that members of the low status group
acknowledged the status difference and per-
ceived a greater percentage of outgroup than
ingroup members possessed the positive status
traits (F(1, 148) = 28.53, p < .01) and a greater
percentage of ingroup than outgroup members
possessed the negative status traits (F(1, 148) =
5.66, p < .05). At the same time, they evidenced
a strategic process of intergroup comparison
and perceived the positive irrelevant traits to be
possessed by a greater percentage of ingroup
than outgroup members (F(1, 148) = 17.68, p <
.01), and the negative irrelevant traits to be pos-
sessed by a greater percentage of outgroup
than ingroup members (F(1, 148) = 15.49, p <
.01).
Trait similarity measure4 The predicted Status
 Group  Relevance  Valence four-way
interaction was significant (F(2, 287) = 17.72,
p < .01). The bottom panel of Table 3 displays
the relevant means. The Group  Relevance 
Valence effect was significant for the high status
group (F(2, 147) = 5.10, p < .01), and low status
group (F(2, 145) = 14.26, p < .01).
For the high status group, the Group 
Valence interaction was significant for the
status traits (F(1, 148) = 44.93, p < .01), power
traits (F(1, 148) = 25.89, p < .01), and irrelevant
traits (F(1, 148) = 20.52, p < .01). Tests of the
group effect in levels of valence indicated that
members of the high status group perceived
more similarity among members of the ingroup
than outgroup on the positive status traits (F(1,
148) = 55.74, p < .01), positive power traits (F(1,
148) = 30.64, p < .01), and positive irrelevant
traits (F(1, 148) = 4.47, p < .01). On the other
hand, they perceived more similarity among
members of the outgroup than ingroup on the
negative status traits (F(1, 148) = 8.12, p < .01),
and negative irrelevant traits (F(1, 148) = 20.15,
p < .01).
For the low status group, the Group 
Valence interaction was significant for the
status traits (F(1, 146) = 17.79, p < .01), and
irrelevant traits (F(1, 146) = 4.45, p < .05). Tests
of the group effect in levels of valence indicated
that members of the low status group acknowl-
edged the status difference and perceived more
similarity among members of the outgroup
than ingroup on positive status traits (F(1, 146)
= 39.75, p < .01). Simultaneously, however, they
evidenced a strategic process of intergroup
comparison and perceived more similarity
among members of the outgroup than ingroup
on the negative irrelevant traits (F(1, 146) =
3.98, p < .05). The means also suggested a non-
significant tendency for members of low status
groups to perceive the ingroup as more similar
than the outgroup on positive irrelevant traits.
Range measure The range did not detect the
predicted four-way interaction (F(2, 288) = 1.51,
ns). Instead, the range yielded a Group 
Relevance  Status effect (F(2, 288) = 4.25, p <
.05). Table 4 displays the relevant means. The
Group  Relevance interaction was significant
for members of the low status group (F(2, 147)
= 4.01, p < .05) but not for members of the high
status group (F(2, 146) = .70, ns). Pairwise com-
parisons indicated that members of low status
groups perceived a greater range among
ingroup vs. outgroup members (i.e. outgroup
homogeneity) on only the status traits (F(1, 148)
= 10.11, p < .01). Participants did not perceive
intergroup differences on the other traits.
Additionally, the range yielded a Group 
Relevance  Power effect (F(2, 288) = 3.33, p <
.05). Table 5 displays the relevant means. The
Group  Relevance interaction was significant
for members of the high power group (F(2,
146) = 3.32, p < .05), but not for members of the
low power group (F(2, 147) = .53, ns). Pairwise
comparisons indicated that members of high
power groups perceived a greater range among
ingroup vs. outgroup members (i.e. outgroup
homogeneity) on only the status traits (F(1, 147)
= 6.44, p < .05). Participants did not perceive
intergroup differences on the other traits.
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Factor analysis As we speculated in the dis-
cussion of Experiment 1, the percent estimate
measure may reflect perceptions of central
tendency rather than variability. Consequently,
we included a measure of similarity to tap per-
ceptions of intergroup variability. Indeed an
exploratory factor analysis demonstrated that
percent estimate and mean together reflect a
construct different than that of similarity. In
particular, we conducted an exploratory factor
analysis using varimax rotation. We treated
ingroup and outgroup ratings as separate indi-
cators of each measure. All criteria for deter-
mining the number of factors to retain (i.e.
eigenvalues, scree plot, and proportion of
variance explained) unambiguously indicated
the retention of three factors. Table 6 contains
the factor loadings from the rotated factor
pattern matrix. The factor pattern matrix,
which reflects the variance in each item that is
uniquely contributed by each factor, indicates
that the mean and percent estimate measures
have strong loadings on Factor 1 and near zero
loadings on Factors 2 and 3. The range measure
has strong loadings on Factor 2 and near zero
loadings on Factors 1 and 3. The trait similarity
measure has strong loadings on Factor 3 and
near zero loadings on Factors 1 and 2.
Discussion
Consistent with our speculation, the factor
analysis indicated that the similarity measure
tapped a construct distinct from that of the
mean and percent estimate. Nevertheless, the
mean, percent estimate, and similarity
measures detected the same four-way inter-
action detected in the previous experiment.
The pattern of the interaction was consistent
with SIT’s strategic intergroup comparison
account and was not moderated by power.
Members of both status groups acknowledged
the status hierarchy on the positive status traits
Boldry & Gaertner status and intergroup perception
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Table 4. Mean range perception (and standard deviations) as a function of group, relevance, and status
Status Status relevant Power relevant Irrelevant
High status
Ingroup 3.83(1.13) 3.87(1.12) 3.92(1.15)
Outgroup 3.90(1.15) 3.89(1.23) 3.92(1.25)
Low status
Ingroup 4.03(1.15) 3.77(1.14) 3.93(1.22)
Outgroup 3.82(1.14) 3.73(1.19) 3.85(1.17)
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. Sample size for high status groups varies from 148–149 (due to
missing data) and for low status groups is 149. Higher numbers indicate a greater perceived range among
group members.
Table 5. Mean range perception (and standard deviations) as a function of group, relevance, and power
Power Status relevant Power relevant Irrelevant
High power
Ingroup 3.90(1.20) 3.77(1.20) 3.85(1.21)
Outgroup 3.75(1.20) 3.78(1.27) 3.83(1.27)
Low power
Ingroup 3.96(1.09) 3.87(1.07) 4.00(1.15)
Outgroup 3.97(1.08) 3.84(1.15) 3.94(1.14)
Notes : Standard deviations are in parentheses. Sample size is 148 for high power groups and varies between
149–150 (due to missing data) for low power groups. Higher numbers indicate a greater perceived range
among group members.
as such that they perceived those traits to be
more descriptive of, possessed by a greater per-
centage of, and a stronger basis of similarity
among members of the high than low status
group. Only members of the high status group
acknowledged the status differential on the
negative status traits by perceiving those traits
to be more descriptive of, possessed by a greater
percentage of, and a stronger basis of similarity
among members of the low than high status
group.
Members of both groups evidenced ingroup
favoring perceptions on the positive and
negative irrelevant traits. They perceived the
positive irrelevant traits to be more descriptive
of, possessed by a greater percentage of, and a
stronger basis of similarity among ingroup than
outgroup members and perceived the negative
traits to be more descriptive of, possessed by a
greater percentage of, and a stronger basis of
similarity among outgroup than ingroup
members. As in the previous experiment, only
members of the high status group further
enhanced the social value of the ingroup on the
power relevant traits. In particular, members of
the high status group perceived the positive
power traits to be more descriptive of, pos-
sessed by a greater percentage of, and as having
a stronger basis of similarity among ingroup
than outgroup members and perceived the
negative status traits to be more descriptive of
and possessed by a greater percentage of
ingroup than outgroup members.
As in the previous experiment, the range
measure did not detect the predicted four-way
interaction. The range did detect a theoreti-
cally ambiguous Group  Relevance  Status
effect and a Group  Relevance  Power
effect, such that members of high status groups
and members of high power groups are particu-
larly apt to perceive a greater range among
ingroup than outgroup members on status
relevant traits regardless of the valence of those
traits. Although, it is plausible that the patterns
of the range are meaningful, the ambiguity of
those patterns and their inconsistency across
studies implies a degree of spuriousness.
Finally, readers might wonder whether an
intergroup payoff asymmetry provides an
alternative explanation of our data. In particu-
lar, the rational choice for both groups on the
power matrix of the current experiment (see
Figure 1) is the Y choice, in which members of
the high and low power groups receive US$0.75
and US$0.35, respectively. So, in addition to
having greater fate control over the low power
group, the high power group receives a larger
payoff when both groups select the rational
choice. Experiment 1, however, eliminates the
viability of an intergroup payoff asymmetry
explanation. Experiments 1 and 2 evidenced
the same four-way interaction derived from
social identity theory and in no instance did
power (or interdependence) moderate that
effect. Importantly, ingroup and outgroup
members in Experiment 1 received the same
amount of money when both groups selected
the rational choice (also, the Y choice): US$0.75
and US$0.75 in the independent condition and
US$0.45 and US$0.45 in the interdependent
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Table 6. Factor loadings for the iintergroup perception measures from the rotated factor pattern
Factor pattern
Item Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
Mean—Ingroup .54 .01 .16
Mean—Outgroup .59 –.01 –.02
Percent Estimate—Ingroup .76 .06 .04
Percent Estimate—Outgroup .73 .01 –.12
Trait Similarity—Ingroup .03 –.04 1.01
Trait Similarity—Outgroup .03 –.07 .65
Range—Ingroup .03 .85 –.13
Range—Outgroup .01 1.00 –.01
condition. Consequently, an intergroup payoff
asymmetry cannot account for the predicted
effects of Experiment 1, which Experiment 2
replicated. On that basis an intergroup payoff
asymmetry is not a viable alternative explanation
and we can be confident in our conclusion that
relative status affects intergroup perception
independently of intergroup power.
General discussion
Intergroup status and power typically covary in
social environments. Such covariation poses a
difficulty for a science of intergroup relations
that has the goal of differentiating and explain-
ing the multiple causes of social perception
with valid process based accounts. The current
research advances the intergroup literature by
methodologically distinguishing the effect of
status from power. We utilized two methods of
distinguishing status from power. In Experi-
ment 1, we manipulated the relative status of
two social groups and explicitly provided those
groups with equivalent power. In Experiment 2,
we orthogonally manipulated the groups’
relative status and power. Despite their
methodological differences, the two experi-
ments yielded remarkably consistent results
indicating that relative status affects intergroup
perception independently of power.
Evidence for a strategic intergroup
comparison account of the status effect
The design of the experiments enables us to
discuss, with a degree of confidence, the
process by which status affects intergroup per-
ception. SIT suggests that low intergroup status
poses a social identity threat and motivates
intergroup comparison on alternative dimen-
sions that yield a more favorable impression of
the ingroup (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Such moti-
vated biases often influence intergroup percep-
tion on ambiguous dimensions that lack social
consensus as to which group is superior
(Ellemers et al., 1997) and constrain and
enhance perceived variability in a manner that
promotes a positive social identity (e.g. ‘all of us
are not bad’ or ‘all of us are good’; Ellemers &
van Risjswijk, 1997; Rubin et al., 2001).
Consistent with the strategic intergroup com-
parison account, both experiments detected
the predicted Status  Group  Relevance 
Valence four-way interaction across multiple
measures, including the mean, percent
estimate and, perceived similarity. That is, inter-
group status yielded different perceptions of
the ingroup vs. outgroup and the nature of
those perceptions varied as a function of the
relevance and valence of the dimension of
intergroup comparison.
On the positive status dimension, members
of both the low and high status groups acknowl-
edged the established status hierarchy.
Members of both groups evidenced consensual
perceptions and perceived the positive status
traits to be more descriptive of, possessed by a
greater percentage of, and a stronger basis of
similarity among member of the high than low
status group. Such consensual perceptions,
however, were limited to the positive status
dimension. Members of both the low and high
status groups perceived their own group more
favorably than the outgroup on the irrelevant
dimension (i.e. traits that were irrelevant to the
status and power tasks). Consistent with the
strategic intergroup perception account, group
members capitalized on the ambiguous nature
of the irrelevant traits and enhanced their
social identity (e.g. ‘We are all happier, funnier,
and more athletic than are they and they are all
more shallow, grumpy, and dull than are we’.).
The pattern of intergroup perception across
the positive status traits and the irrelevant traits
reflects what Ellemers et al. (1997) refers to as
balancing social reality with group identity. On
the other hand, the negative status traits may
have captured an instance in which concern for
group identity overwhelmed social reality. Only
members of the high status group acknowl-
edged the confirmed status difference on the
negatively valenced status dimension. Members
of the low status group evidenced equivalent
perceptions of the ingroup and outgroup. The
tendency for members of the low status group
to acknowledge the status hierarchy on the
positive but not the negative status traits can be
explained potentially by research indicating
that threat is a stronger motivator than
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enhancement (e.g. Baumeister, Bratslavsky,
Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001; Ito, Larsen, Smith, &
Cacioppo, 1998; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).
Acknowledging that members of the ingroup
(relative to the outgroup) possess negative
qualities might be more threatening than
acknowledging that members of the ingroup
lack positive qualities. Perceiving the ingroup
and higher status outgroup equivalently on a
dimension on which the groups objectively
differ is certainly suggestive of an ingroup
favoring perceptual bias. That is, not perceiving
existent group differences is as biased as per-
ceiving nonexistent differences (Brauer, 2001).
We did not offer predictions for the pattern
of perception on the power traits because we
were uncertain as to how those traits would
relate to social identity concerns. From a data
driven position, however, those traits merit dis-
cussion in that both experiments revealed the
same pattern of intergroup perception.
Members of high status groups evidenced
ingroup favoring perceptions on the positive
and negative power traits.5 Members of the low
status group, however, evidenced equivalent
intergroup perception on the positive and
negative power traits. It is important to reiterate
that the low and high status groups were objec-
tively equivalent in regard to power in Experi-
ment 1. In Experiment 2, power and status were
manipulated orthogonally and the power
manipulation did not qualify the patterns of
perception, such that the tendency for
members of the low status group to perceive
equivalent intergroup perception on the power
traits occurred regardless of whether the low
status group was low or high in power.
So, why did members of the high status group
perceive ingroup favoring differences on the
power traits while members of the low status
group evidenced equivalent intergroup percep-
tions? Perhaps a socially confirmed status differ-
ence ‘boosts the confidence’ of members of the
higher status group and, conversely, makes
members of the low status group more vigilant
to the dimension of comparison. That is, a con-
firmed status difference might legitimize
ingroup favoritism across domains of compari-
son for members of the high status group and,
as Ellemers et al. (1997) suggest, motivate
members of the low status group toward a more
selective or strategic intergroup perception
based on available information.
In sum, Experiments 1 and 2 provide consist-
ent support for the strategic intergroup com-
parison process derived from social identity
theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and empirical
extensions (e.g. Ellemers et al., 1997). Further-
more, our data reiterate the importance of the
relevance and valence of the dimension of
intergroup comparison (e.g. Doosje, Haslam,
Spears, Oakes, & Koomen, 1998; Simon, 1992)
as well as the ingroup’s relative status (e.g.
Doosje, Spears, & Koomen, 1995; Lorenzi-
Cioldi et al., 1998). Importantly, the current
research demonstrates that relative group status
affects intergroup perception (central tendency
and variability) independently of power.
Inconsistencies between the range and the
other measures of intergroup perception
The mean, percent estimate, and similarity evi-
denced the same four-way interaction. The
range measure, on the other hand, neither
tracked the predicted four-way interaction nor
evidenced consistency across studies. Further-
more, in instances in which the range evi-
denced a difference in the perceived variability
of the ingroup vs. outgroup, the direction of
that difference was opposite to the pattern
detected by the other measures (i.e. ingroup vs.
outgroup homogeneity). One explanation as to
why the range revealed patterns different than
the other measures is that unlike the other
measures, which required participants to make
judgments at the group level, the range
measure required participants to make judg-
ments in regard to specific individuals (the two
most extreme group members). Although this
group- vs. person-level focus cannot account for
the inconsistent pattern in the range across
studies, it can account for the discrepancy
between the range and the other measures.
However, the group-level focus cannot account
for all variation in perception. Indeed, the
factor analysis revealed that similarity loaded on
a construct different than that of the mean and
percent estimate, suggesting that the strategic
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intergroup comparison mechanism of SIT
affects perceptions of variability as well as
central tendency.
What about intergroup power?
Both experiments consistently indicated that
status affects intergroup perception indepen-
dent of power. Aside from the Group 
Relevance  Power effect detected by the range
measure in Experiment 2, the power manipula-
tions had no apparent effect on the dependent
measures. So, what should we conclude about
the effect of power?
It is noteworthy that the checks for the power
manipulations were significant and in the
intended direction. In Experiment 1, in which
we attempted to equate the relative power of
the ingroup and outgroup, participants
attributed equal power to the ingroup and
outgroup and, as we intended, perceived both
groups as being more powerful in the inter-
dependent than independent condition. In
Experiment 2, in which we manipulated relative
group power, participants attributed less power
to the ingroup vs. outgroup in the low power
condition and more power to the ingroup vs.
outgroup in the high power condition. Further-
more, the effect of relative group power was
descriptively large. The effect size (d) in Exper-
iment 2 for the manipulation of relative power
on the perceived power of the ingroup vs.
outgroup was 1.39 (with a 95% confidence
interval of 1.26 to 1.51). Consequently, the
argument for a weak or failed manipulation
cannot explain the relatively nonexistent effect
of power on the measures of mean, percent
estimate, similarity, and range.
Given the sufficient manipulations of power
and their minimal effects on intergroup percep-
tion, some readers might conclude that inter-
group power does not affect perception. We
strongly caution that our methodology does not
warrant such a conclusion. We intentionally
restricted the information participants received
about ingroup and outgroup members to differ-
entiate the effects of status from power on inter-
group perception. As we previously discussed,
intergroup power is argued to affect perception
either directly by increasing attention to
outgroup members (e.g. Fiske, 1993) or indi-
rectly, by constraining the actual behavioral
diversity of low status groups and yielding a
homogeneous pool of information about those
groups (Guinote et al., 2002). Because we did
not provide idiosyncratic characteristics of
ingroup and outgroup members, the experi-
mental context was not sensitive to potential
power effects and it is not appropriate to
conclude that intergroup power does not affect
perception. The current research does demon-
strate, however, that status affects perception
independent of power via a strategic intergroup
comparison process.
Perceiver status and target status
Often it is difficult to interpret effects of inter-
group status in paradigms employing only two
social groups (Brauer, 2001). In such a
paradigm, status is asymmetrical (one group is
high in status and the other is low) and it is not
immediately obvious whether a status effect is
due to the status of the perceiver (i.e. being in
a low or high status group) or the target (i.e.
perceiving a low or high status group). A target
effect produces consensual intergroup percep-
tions among members of both groups. For
example, when the low status group perceives
outgroup homogeneity and the high status
group perceives ingroup homogeneity the per-
ceptions are consensual in that members of
both groups perceive less variability in the high
status group. A perceiver effect, on the other
hand, produces divergent perceptions between
members of both groups. That is, members of
both groups disagree as to which group is more
or less variable.
By assessing intergroup perception on
multiple dimensions of comparison we obtained
patterns consistent with both perceiver and
target effects. We obtained consensual percep-
tions on the positive status traits such that
members of both groups acknowledged the
status advantage of the high than low status
group. On the remaining traits (i.e. negative
status, positive and negative power, and positive
and negative irrelevant) we obtained divergent
perceptions between members of the low and
high status groups. The apparent target effect
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on the positive status traits was driven by the
confirmed status difference such that members
of both groups were aware of the status hier-
archy. However, the divergent patterns of per-
ception on the negative status traits suggest that
a target effect does not invariantly result from
existing group differences. Further attention
should be directed at contextual and intrapsy-
chic factors that generate target and perceiver
effects (e.g. Brauer, 2001).
Caveat
A limitation of the current research is that
status and power were not manipulated at the
same perceptual level. Specifically, relative
group status was presented to participants as a
global property of the ingroup and outgroup
(e.g. Klees typically score better than Kandin-
skys), whereas relative group power was pre-
sented as specific to the experimental situation.
Consequently, it may be that conclusions from
the present research are generalizable only to
intergroup contexts in which group status is
global and group power is situational. Future
research should explore the boundaries of
these effects in alternate intergroup contexts
(e.g. Christensen, Boldry, & Kashy, 2004).
Conclusion
The current research methodologically distin-
guished intergroup status from power and
revealed that intergroup status affects inter-
group perceptions independently of power.
Furthermore, the strategic intergroup compari-
son process of social identity theory provides a
viable explanation for the status effect in that
the patterns of intergroup perception varied as
a function of the relevance and valence of the
dimension of intergroup comparison in a
manner that balanced the constraints of social
reality with a drive toward a positive social
identity.
Notes
1. Group size covaries with status and power and
certainly contributes to interpretational
difficulties. We control for relative group size by
holding it constant and explicitly informing
participants that the groups consist of an equal
number of members. Past research has
differentiated the effects of relative group status
and size by orthogonally manipulating those
factors (Ellemers & Van Rijswijk, 1997) or by
holding size constant and manipulating status
(Lorenzi-Cioldi, Eagly, & Stewart, 1995). Those
studies did not differentiate status and power.
2. We planned to use a distribution task that
measures the probability of differentiation 
(Pd; Linville, Fischer, & Salovey, 1989). However,
pilot testing indicated that the distribution task
provided a Pd measure with extremely low
internal consistency and doubled the time
required to complete the session. An experience
consonant with Park and Judd’s (1990)
observation that, ‘subjects sometimes have
difficulty completing the distribution task’
(p. 175).
3. We considered treating positive traits as
stereotype consistent and negative traits as
stereotype inconsistent to construct a measure of
percent estimate similar to those used in previous
research. However such an approach was not
possible with the irrelevant traits, and, more
importantly would prevent us from examining the
Group  Status  Relevance  Valence
interaction predicted by social identity theory.
4. We do not have responses to the trait similarity
measure for two participants.
5. The one exception being the perception of the
ingroup and outgroup on the negative traits with
the similarity measure in Experiment 2. Although
the direction of the means was consistent with the
pattern on the other measures, the difference was
not statistically significant.
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